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ABSTRACT

In a Data-centric Delay Tolerant Networks(DTNs), it is essential for nodes to
cooperate in message forwarding in order to enable successful delivery of a message in an
opportunistic fashion with nodes having their social interests defined. In the data-centric
dissemination protocol proposed here, a source annotates messages(images) with
keywords, and then intermediate nodes are presented with an option of adding keywordbased annotations in order to create higher content strength messages on path toward the
destination. Hence, contents like images get enriched as there is situation evolution or
learned by these intermediate nodes, such as in a battlefield, or in a disaster situation. Nodes
might turn selfish and not participate in relaying messages due to relative scarcity of battery
and storage capacity in mobile devices. Therefore, in addition to content enrichment, an
incentive mechanism is proposed in this thesis which considers factors like message
quality, battery usage, level of interests, etc for the calculation of incentives. Moreover,
with the goal of preventing the nodes from turning malicious by adding inappropriate
message tags in the quest of acquiring more incentive, a distributed reputation model
(DRM) is developed and consolidated with the proposed incentive scheme. DRM takes
into account inputs from multiple users like ratings for the relevance of annotations in the
message, message quality, etc. The proposed scheme safeguards the network from
congestion due to uncooperative or selfish nodes in the system. The performance
evaluation shows that our approach delivers more high priority and high quality messages
while reducing traffic at a slightly lower message delivery ratio compared to ChitChat.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The ever-rising use of mobile devices in the world has made it possible to form a
highly effective and efficient mobile p2p network. The concept of delay tolerant networks
was introduced because of the lack of infrastructure in disaster affected areas and extraterrestrial networks. Due to the realization that it is not possible to deliver messages
instantaneously in such scenarios, algorithms that allow the incorporation of the delay were
developed. NASA and other organizations were funded to develop a proposal for
Interplanetary Internet(IPN). The initial architecture was proposed keeping in mind the
significant delays and packet corruption in deep space communications. Over time, some
of the ideas proposed for IPN were adapted to and the term “delay-tolerant networking”
was coined.
The causes for disruption can be limits of wireless radio range, sparsity of mobile
nodes, energy resources, attack, and noise. To counteract these challenges, routing
protocols were proposed. One of the first few protocols defined was epidemic
dissemination of data. In this protocol, every device transmits all the data possessed to
every other encountered device and vice-versa. Although this algorithm achieves the
highest delivery ratio, the overhead it imposes is huge. This overhead is measured in terms
of energy consumption and used data space at the node level and overall traffic at the
network level. Other routing mechanisms were therefore proposed and implemented in
different scenarios by taking into account the suitability of trade-off between throughput
and overhead.
As time evolved, researchers realized that the problems faced in disruption tolerant
networks appear in many other scenarios. Therefore, issues involved in vehicular ad-hoc
networks, rural communication, conferences, etc. can also be solved by the DTN
architecture.
Figure 1.1 below shows the architecture of DTN. Nodes can be stationary or
mobile. A DTN node shares the data with another node when a successful connection is
established. When an intermittent link goes down, it another path can be used to deliver a
message. Multiple paths can therefore be used to share the message. This is why it is also
called as opportunistic communication.
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Figure 1.1. DTN Architecture

The following subsection defines routing.
1.1. ROUTING IN DTN
As the traditional routing algorithms like Open shortest path first(OSPF), Gateway
Routing Protocol(GTP) cannot be used directly in DTNs because they require a continuous
end-to-end connectivity, other schemes have been proposed. Broadly, the algorithms can
be classified as node-centric and data-centric. Node-centric algorithms are further
classified as flooding-based and forwarding-based.
A few examples of flooding-based are Epidemic, Direct-contact, Two-hop-relay,
and Spray-and-Wait. In Direct-Contact routing algorithm, the source node directly
forwards a bundle to the destination node. Some variants of epidemic routing are prioritybased and immunity-based. In two-hop relay, a message will be delivered to destination if
source and destination are within two-hops reachability. In Spray-and-Wait, replicas of a
message are distributed to an optimal number of nodes rather than all the nodes. This can
also be considered another variant of Epidemic routing.
Some of the forwarding-based algorithms are NECTAR, Source Routing, and PerHop routing. NECTAR maintains a neighborhood index table at each node which stores
the information about the meeting frequency of encountering nodes in the network. Nodes
with higher index are forwarded bundles. Source Routing has two phases, viz., route
discovery and route maintenance. Route discovery phase discovers the route from source
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to destination with intermediate nodes appending its address in the discovery packet. Route
maintenance phase throws a route error when a link is broken. In per-hop routing, decisions
about forwarding to the next hop are made individually by each node. The next subsection
defines data-centric routing.

1.2. DATA-CENTRIC ROUTING
Given a vast amount of information to disseminate, it is important to prioritize the
data delivery to the data which is relevant to the nodes. Therefore, it makes more sense for
the nodes to analyze the content of the received bundles before making decisions about the
next hop to forward rather than just blindly forwarding the data without knowing the data
itself. A security issue of what if a relay uses the received data for malicious purposes
arises. In such cases, data can be encrypted but a set of metadata keywords can be defined
to tag the data with.
Data-centric routing was proposed to further reduce the overhead in the network
while also giving a reasonable throughput with only the relevant contextual data being
forwarded and ultimately delivered. Examples of Data-centric routing algorithms are
CEDO[1] and ChitChat[2].
CEDO is acronym for Content Centric Dissemination algorithm. It solves the
problem of how nodes should replicate content so that the network throughput is
maximized. The idea is to allow nodes to make requests for content at random times. The
request is tagged with TTL, which when expires, the request is deleted from the entire
network. If a node m comes in contact with node n and node n has content in its buffer that
m requested, m can retrieve the content from node n.
ChitChat, on the other hand, is a bit intricate and sophisticated compared to CEDO.
Every node has predefined interests that act as subscription keywords. Keywords are
mapped with the corresponding strength which rises or falls depending upon the
encountering nodes’ keyword strengths. When a node m encounters node n, node m decides
to forward the content possessed by it to node n if the keyword strength in n for the content
equals or exceeds that in node m.
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1.3. MOTIVATION
Having the most efficient and effective routing mechanism in place does not mean
that the nodes will start cooperating with each other in the process of relaying. This is
owing to the fact that the mobile nodes have limited battery power and also relatively small
storage space for storing the in-transit messages.
The main problem we solve in this paper are of identification of selfish nodes and
eliminating the traffic due to them. We introduce a concept of content-enrichment as well
which allows the nodes to make the in-transit packets richer in metadata information. Apart
from this, there is a need for a reputation based mechanism. All these three problems and
their novel solutions are described briefly in the subsections below:
1.3.1. Need to Identify Selfish Nodes. Selfish nodes are defined as the nodes which
either refuse from receiving incoming packets for relaying, dropping existing packets even
before the time-to-live(TTL) is not over and the message has not been forwarded, and
denial of participation in relaying the acquired messages. An important characteristic of
such nodes is that they receive the messages intended for them and not receive the messages
for relaying. This might be accomplished by switching on the communication medium
when in need and switch it off when not. The existence of these category of nodes is a very
serious problem in delay tolerant networks because these networks rely on nodes
forwarding the data to the encountered hops. If the message bundles are not forwarded to
the encountered nodes, this might result in unsuccessful delivery of those bundles.
We have therefore defined an incentive mechanism which motivates all nodes to
participate in the message transactions. This mechanism ensures fairness to all the devices.
The developed mechanism is primarily based on credit-based. Every nodes is assigned a
pre-defined number of tokens initially. All nodes are assigned the same number of tokens.
They can then use these tokens to pay as compensation for message transactions.
Consider a scenario of a selfish node which receives the messages it wants and does
not participate in forwarding. In this case, the selfish node will end up paying all of its
assigned incentive tokens and be left with zero tokens eventually. Unless the node
participates in relaying and gains more tokens to pay for the content it requires, the node
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will not be able to receive the interesting content. Therefore, the traffic due to those selfish
nodes will be curbed.
1.3.2. Content Enrichment. Consider a scenario where nodes can take a peek into
the data being relayed by them and happen to have supplementary information about the
content. If the metadata with which this bundle is tagged does not reflect the above
additional information about the content of the bundle, it makes sense for these relay nodes
to add more metadata keywords. There is, therefore, an elevated possibility for the number
of destinations to be risen. Additionally, the added information can help the nodes to have
a much better situational awareness. This adding of metadata keywords is what we call
content enrichment.
The question which needs to be addressed is why a user might be feeling generous
enough to enrich the content. In other words, what is the profit of a user who is adding
more metadata keywords? A rational user adding the keywords cannot be certain that other
users will do the same. Therefore, even the generous users might lose the motivation to do
so. In order to facilitate the content enrichment, we define in the scheme that the user
adding relevant metadata keywords can attain more incentive tokens from the destination
than what were promised to it by the sender. This scheme ensures fairness and validates
that the users are paid proportionately to their contribution.
1.3.3. Distributed Reputation Model. Malicious nodes are defined as the ones
which either generate poor quality messages or add irrelevant keywords to the passing
bundle. The motivation behind this behavior can be to gain higher incentive tokens. For
example, consider a node which acquired a message consisting of an image of a tree tagged
with the keyword “tree”. Based on our content enrichment scheme, this node can add more
irrelevant keywords. Let us say the node adds keywords “car”, “books” and “building”. Let
us say this malicious node delivers the message to the nodes having the subscription
keywords “car” and “building”. Since the message transaction is automatic, the
destinations for the delivered messages provide extra incentive to the malicious nodes. The
mobile node is limited with computational power and memory, it definitely cannot execute
the machine learning algorithms on its own. Therefore, user intervention is required to
identify the malicious nodes and notifying the other encountered nodes about the identified
malicious nodes.
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A user can make decisions about quality of message and relevance of the additional
keyword annotations post-reception. Therefore, a rating can be added for individual nodes
and then shared with other nodes in order to spread the reputation of the nodes network
wide and enabling other nodes to avoid receiving from malicious nodes. Furthermore, the
decisions of incentive awarding are done by taking into consideration of the reputation of
nodes. In our approach, a percentage of incentive is provided to deliverers with reputation
value below a certain threshold.
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2. RELATED WORK

There has been sizable amount of work on Incentive mechanism in Delay Tolerant
Networks. Since the incentive mechanisms that we have developed is based on credit and
reputation, it is important to note down those kinds of previous and related works. Thus,
the following subsections manifest these two types of work in detail:
2.1. CREDIT BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM
These kind of incentive mechanisms are based on rewarding nodes for generating
or relaying messages. There are two broad classification in these: i) where source pays the
incentive tokens, and ii) where destination pays incentive tokens for the relayed message.
Mobicent[3],PI[4],[5], MuRIS[6], TFT[7] are some of the works that are related to
varying degrees with credit-based work in the proposed scheme in this thesis.
In MobiCent, client’s payments and the relays’ rewards are set with a goal that
nodes will behave truthfully. Therefore, packets will always be forwarded by nodes without
adding phantom links, and the nodes will not let the contact opportunity go to waste unless
the reward is not adequate or the decisions of the underlying mechanism dictate that. The
underlying routing protocol will find the best available path for a message delivery. There
are three kinds of nodes in the Mobicent architecture: i) Trusted third party which stores
key information for all nodes and provides verification and payment services. ii) Helpers,
which are static or mobile nodes, relay content via short range, high speed and intermittent
communication links. iii) Mobile clients that are the destinations which have highbandwidth intermittent links for data transfer and highly available but low bit rate links for
control messages.
In PI, a source attaches an attractive as well as fair incentive to a bundle. In this
system, there is a trusted authority(TA) which does not participate in bundle forwarding
but rather it performs clearance of credit and reputation for DTN nodes. Every DTN node
before joining the network registers itself with the TA to get its personal credit
account(PCA) and a personal reputation account(PRA).When a node later establishes a
connection with the TA, it can make requests to TA for credit and reputation clearance. An
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intermediate node when participates in bundle forwarding, it can get credits from the
source. At the same time, it can get reputation from the TA. Therefore, PI relies on a
centralized trusted authority for reputation management.
In [5], the authors have defined a two-hop scheme in which a source generates a
message, forwards it to a relay along with a promise of incentive and a relay when
delivering a message receives the promised incentive from the destination. They have three
settings that they evaluate based on two parameters: i) Number of circulated copies for a
bundle and ii) Duration of time for which those copies have been present in the network.
The three settings are: i) full information, ii) partial information, and iii) no information. A
source when forwarding a bundle to a relay along with a promise of the incentive, it gives
the relay either full, partial or no information. The full information implies that the source
tells the relay the number of copies that it has distributed before and also the time for which
those copies have been in the network. The partial information signifies that the source
only gives out the information about the number of copies. The no information setting
means that the source does not give any information about the copies in circulation. A
relay therefore can decide if the incentive being promised to it is fair or not in terms of
whether it will be able to deliver the message first. The reason behind this is that in this
scheme, a relay to forward a message to a destination only receives the promised incentive
from the destination if it is a first deliverer to that destination. The relay however can
deliver the copies of the messages to multiple destinations and receive the incentive
promise.
In [6], MuRIS, an incentive driven information sharing in DTNs is proposed. It
dynamically constructs efficient multicast delivery paths for multiple destinations
interested in the same data item. An incentive mechanism motivates the uncooperative
nodes so that they collect rewards associated with their forwarding efforts. There are two
phases in MuRIS, viz., Information collection stage and Data Forwarding stage. In the
warmup stage of Information collection, nodes use probe/receipt messages to learn about
paths from publishers to various subscribers in the network. In addition to this, when two
nodes encounter, they exchange the path information that is gathered by them and
subsequently update their paths. Based on this, each nodes constructs a feasible path set. A
closeness vector is also constructed based on encounter histories. In the Data forwarding
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stage, nodes exchange the data items of interests to each other. For the data items that could
be forwarded by the other node, a node quantifies the reward for forwarding based on the
feasible path set and the closeness vector. A data item is forwarded to the other node only
if the path via the other node has a promise of providing the highest expected reward.
In [7], the authors have proposed a Tit-For-Tat scheme which is an incentive-aware
routing in DTNs. The main goal of TFT is to maximize the delivered traffic within a certain
time frame. Their routing protocol consists of the following three components: (i) Link
State Dissemination module in which every node periodically exchanges link state, (ii)
Route computation module in which each source computes the forwarding paths based on
link state and uses source routing to send its traffic, (iii) Acknowledgement dissemination
module upon receiving data, each destination sends ACK via flooding and the source uses
it to update its TFT constraints for the next interval. It is built on source routing because
source routing can be used to optimize customized parameters for a source. The main
assumption in this paper is that the link state is disseminated faithfully. They focus to make
the data-plane incentive compatible. Acknowledgements can provide useful feedback
required by TFT. Specifically, every node receiving the ACK first verifies the integrity of
the attached source route and then checks if its identifier is present in the relay list. If it is,
then the node increments its local TFT counters to indicate that the next node in the list
successfully relayed a packet for it. Credit is only given to relay nodes on the forwarding
path.
2.2. REPUTATION BASED RELAY COORDINATION
Reputation based coordination schemes are the ones in which nodes make use of
the reputation values of the encountered nodes to determine whether to transfer a bundle
to those nodes. In distributed reputation models, nodes take decisions by themselves after
gathering information from previously encountered nodes, without intervention or
assistance from a centralized entity. There are various ways to determine malicious nodes.
The rule of thumb is the lower the reputation of a node, the more malicious that node is.
Some of the related approaches of distributed reputation metric in delay tolerant networks
are given below.
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REPSYS[8] is a recently proposed robust and distributed system for delay-tolerant
networks. It utilizes a modified Bayesian approach to identify malicious nodes.

A

reputation rating Rij between two nodes i and j is managed by the reputation module. It is
updated when either the first-hand information is updated or the second-hand information
is found to be valid. REPSYS is robust against false ratings and it is also efficient at
detecting nodes’ misbehavior. REPSYS is robust because despite taking into account all
the available information, it is resilient against false accusations and praise. It is also
distributed because the decision to interact with another node is made entirely by each
node. Bayesian decision theory is used to classify the nodes after taking into consideration
all the available information. It is based on a Bayesian approach that uses the Beta
distribution, and can be integrated with any DTN routing protocol. There are three modules
in REPSYS: reputation module (reputation collection module, reputation evaluation
module), trust module and routing decision module (that uses Bayesian classification).
In [9], the authors have proposed a trust-based framework for data forwarding in
opportunistic networks. They incorporate idea of a watchdog component at a node which
is responsible for monitoring the behavior of other nodes. Whenever a node, say X,
forwards a message to node Y which in turn forwards the message to node Z, node X looks
out for Positive feedback messages(PFM) from the destinations(Z in this case). The
watchdog component maintains two counters to determine the forwarding behavior of other
nodes. Each node (e.g., node X) which sends out data to its next-hop forwarders, will keep
recording for each of those forwarders how many PFMs corresponding to data sent out
have and have not come back by using two counters, respectively. A next-hop forwarder
is suspicious if no PFMs are received for that forwarder. Therefore, there is no evidence of
good forwarding behavior of that node. The no reception of PFMs due to the intermittent
connectivity nature of opportunistic networks is also taken into account with Beta
probability distribution function.
In [10], an iterative algorithm for trust management and adversary detection is
proposed. Service Providers(SP) are defined as nodes that participate in data forwarding
whereas raters(R) are the ones that rate the data forwarders. The idea is based on Low
Density Parity Code Check (LDPC). A bipartite graph is drawn consisting of SPs and Rs
as vertices. If R has a rating for an SP, an edge is drawn between the two. The algorithm
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(ITRM) is executed at fixed time intervals. In the first iteration of the algorithm execution,
the weight of the edge between an R and an SP is the rating that R has for that SP. A fading
parameter w is defined. In the iterations henceforth, when a new rating between ith rater
and jth SP arrives, the weight of the edge is recalculated as an average of the new rating
and the old rating multiplied with the fading parameter. The decision of whether a node is
good or bad is taken by a Beta probability distribution function. The problem of
whitewashing, i.e., nodes with low ratings cancelling their account and then signing in
again with a new ID in order to get a good rating, is also handled.
Another cooperative watchdog system(CWS) to detect and avoid selfish nodes in
the network in Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks is proposed for in [11]. In this system,
a node assigns a reputation value to each other node. Each time nodes get a contact
opportunity, the CWS updated the reputation score via three modules, viz., classification,
neighbors’ evaluation and decision modules. Nodes are classified into different types based
on their reputation scores and the classification module calculates each node’s cooperative
value. The cooperative value is then used by the decision module to determine whether to
punish or reward the encountered node. Neighbors’ evaluation module determines how
neighbors evaluate a node’s reputation on the network. Neighbors opinions are inquired
and based on that, the reputation values are assigned. At the end of a contact opportunity,
the decision module updates the rating for the encountered node based on the input from
the other two modules.
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PAPER

I. REPUTATION AND CREDIT BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR
DATA-CENTRIC MESSAGE DELIVERY IN DELAY TOLERANT
NETWORKS

Himanshu Jethawa and Sanjay Madria
Department of Computer Science
Missouri University Of Science and Technology, MO 65401
Email: {hj5y3@mst.edu, madrias@mst.edu}

ABSTRACT

In Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs), to ensure successful message delivery,
contribution of mobile nodes in relaying in an opportunistic fashion using social interests
is essential. In our proposed data-centric dissemination protocol here, messages (images)
are annotated with keywords by the source, and then intermediate nodes are presented with
an option of adding keyword-based annotations to create higher content strength messages
en-route toward the destination. Therefore, contents like images get enriched as the
situation evolves or learned by these intermediate nodes, such as in a disaster situation, or
in a battlefield. Due to limited battery and storage capacity in mobile devices, nodes might
turn selfish and not participate in relaying messages. Thus, additionally, an incentive
mechanism is proposed in this paper which considers factors like message quality, level of
interests, battery usage, etc for the calculation of incentives. Moreover, in order to prevent
the nodes from turning malicious by adding inappropriate message tags in pursuit of
acquiring more incentive, a distributed reputation model (DRM) is developed and
integrated with the proposed incentive scheme. DRM takes into account inputs from
multiple users like ratings for the message quality, relevance of annotations in the message,
etc. The proposed scheme thus ensures avoidance of congestion due to uncooperative or
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selfish nodes in the system. The performance evaluation shows that our approach delivers
more high priority and quality messages with reduced traffic with a slightly lower message
delivery ratio compared to ChitChat, where a source forwards a message to intermediate
nodes, which meet or exceed the matching strength of keyword-based interests.

1. INTRODUCTION

Delay tolerant networking (DTN) is a networking paradigm characterized

by

frequent disconnections between nodes in the network hence resulting into lack
of end-to-end connectivity[1]. Message delivery in this scenario is achieved by utilizing
the resources of multiple nodes which act as relays in the network. These nodes relay
content in order for the final destination to receive it. DTN was initially proposed for
inter-planetary networks and disaster relief team networks. Recently, it has also been
applied to environments such as social networks and vehicular networks, and more
recently in defense applications. A key challenge in DTNs is achievement of high message
delivery ratios with finite lifetimes [2][3][4].
In traditional DTNs, nodes are assumed to help other nodes for packet forwarding.
But in a real scenario of DTN deployment, the relay nodes could abstain from
cooperation due to a limited storage capacity and battery lifetime. As mobile nodes
are managed by autonomous parties, the assumption that all the nodes are cooperative
is unrealistic, and at the same time, in defense applications, though the cooperation is
not an issue, but controlling the congestion is important. Therefore, incentive schemes
[7] have been proposed to foster cooperation among participants, and control the
congestion in DTN, which help in relaying messages.
One of the important aspects ignored by DTN routing associated with incentive
schemes is that messages are taken and delivered as black box by relays, but do
not use the knowledge of the relaying users in making the content richer by adding
semantics in terms of annotations. Consider an application like military, where in-transit
users (soldiers) may provide much more information about say images which are in transit
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through DTNs. This can provide much better situational awareness in other applications
also such as disaster response and recovery where situation evolves as time progresses.
Another issue usually ignored in DTNs is the absence of feedback messages,
thereby incurring large delays. In fact, the exchange of rewards between relays
should not require feedback messages. In order to overcome the lack of feed-backs,
the proposed mechanism assumes that a relay receives a positive reward if and only if
it is the first one to deliver the message to the corresponding destination. In a
similar fashion, [6] proposed a two hop incentive scheme in which the source
promises incentives to each and every relay but informs them that only the first one
who deliver the message to the destination, receives the incentive.
In this paper, we present a novel incentive mechanism taking into consideration
reputation of nodes as well as addition of tags in enabling content-centric sharing of data
such as images in DTNs. The parameters considered for incentive calculations are
categorized as software and hardware factors. Software parameters are message size,
message quality, interest levels of connected devices in the message, rank of the users
possessing the connected mobile devices and priority of messages. Hard- ware factor taken
into consideration is the energy consumption of a device delivering the message to the
destination.
One key challenge in developing any incentive mechanism is the presence of
malicious nodes which try to game the system by generating or relaying seemingly
relevant message to the destination at an abstract level while also helping themselves
in attainment of higher incentives. For example, consider a message consisting of an
image of only a ”garden”. A source might annotate this message with a keyword “parking
lot” but there is no parking lot in the image. In this case, since the incentive
mechanism is developed based on the message annotations, a destination with an interest
represented by ”parking lot” pays for false annotations on reception of the message. This
problem is tackled by introducing a distributed reputation metric (DRM).
Most of the existing works on distributed reputation metric depends on the
existence of a centralized entity for reputation management. Even if it is distributed like
recent work in [25], only the behavior of the nodes in terms of routing is evaluated.
It is certainly not feasible for the scenarios involving DTNs which we are considering
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where nodes may modify the contents maliciously. We also took into consideration
different factors for the DTN scenario and developed a novel distributed reputation metric
(DRM). The proposed DRM requires human judgement and input on each message content
and each device owner can give a rating for message content quality and truthfulness of
message annotations.
To the best of our knowledge, no incentive mechanism is designed for data
dissemination in DTN which considers content enrichment of the message (images)
as others are routing-centric. Our proposed scheme works on top of our state of the art
routing called ChitChat routing [5] for data-centric message delivery in DTNs. We selected
ChitChat as it achieves better message delivery ratios with other competitive DTN
routing algorithms, by introducing the concept of transient social relationships (TSRs).
Thus, our current scheme further improves data dissemination throughput within
ChitChat integrated with the content-based incentives and reputation schemes. Note
that our proposed scheme can be integrated with any other DTN routing scheme.
In summary, the following contributions are made here:
• We propose content-based data dissemination by proposing the modification
to the routing phase of the ChitChat algorithm by incorporating incentives associated
with the relaying as well as for making in-transit contents enriched by asking intermediate
nodes to add meaningful annotations (to earn incentives) to improve the throughput and
data quality with respect to the content delivery.
• Incorporating distributed reputation mechanism of users in DTNs, where
incentives earned are linked with reputations of users as well as quality of data.
•The performance evaluation of our credit

and reputation based scheme is

performed using ONE [23] simulator.

2. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND

2.1. RELATED WORK
In literature on DTNs [8][9] , several incentive schemes have been recently
proposed. For example, Mobicent[11] is a credit-based incentive system in which credit
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and cryptographic techniques are integrated to counteract the edge insertion and edge
hiding attacks among nodes. SMART[13] is a secure multilayer credit-based incentive
scheme for DTNs. In SMART, layered coins are provided as incentives to selfish DTN
nodes for bundle forwarding. In [10], Tit-for-Tat (TFT) is used to design an incentiveaware routing protocol in which selfish DTN nodes are allowed to maximize their
individual utilities in conformity with TFT constraints. In [18], authors proposed an
incentive driven dissemination scheme in which nodes are encouraged to cooperate while
choosing delivery paths that can reach maximum number of nodes possible with fewest
transmissions. PI [12] attaches an incentive on the sending bundle to stimulate the selfish
nodes to cooperate in message delivery. MobiGame [14] is an incentive scheme for DTNs
based on user centricity and socially aware reputation. [15] proposes socially selfish
routing in DTNs, where a node considers social willingness to determine whether or not
packets should be relayed to the nodes in the vicinity. Authors in [16] formulate nodal
communication as a two-person cooperative game for a credit-based incentive scheme to
promote nodal collaboration. RELICS [17] is a energy-aware cooperation based incentive
mechanism for selfish DTNs, in which a rank metric is designed to quantify the transit
behavior of a node. [19] is a credit-based incentive system using the theory of Minority
Games [20] in order to attain coordination in distributed fashion. This mechanism considers
the realistic case when the cost for taking part in the forwarding process varies with the
devices technology or the users habits.
In [21], detection of faulty sensors in a DTN node of a wireless sensor network is
performed by using outlier detection algorithm. DISARM [22], another distributed
reputation model, takes into account social relations amongst agents in a multi-agent
environment. In DISARM, the agents draw reasonable conclusions from incomplete and
possibly conflicting information based on factors like correctness, transaction value and so
on. A Robust and Distributed Reputation System for Delay-Tolerant Networks [25] has
been proposed which considers interaction with nodes, feedback messages and false
ratings. [26] uses trust-based framework to more accurately evaluate an encounter's
delivery competency. A graph based iterative algorithm motivated by the prior success of
message passing techniques for decoding low-density parity-check codes over bipartite
graphs is used for adversary detection in [27]. A cooperative watchdog system is proposed
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in [28] in which nodes exchange reputation of previously encountered nodes in the network
in order to detect misbehaved nodes.

2.2. BACKGROUND
This section provides overview of the underlying routing algorithm, ChitChat, used
in our work.
In ChitChat, nodes are users with small pocket devices that are equipped with
ChitChat system, which automatically connect to other devices that are within the
communication range. Each user has their own social profile, i.e., a group of interests
specified by semantic keywords. Messages are also annotated with appropriate metadata
keywords. When two nodes connect with each other, they chitchat to exchange the
following two kinds of information: (i) direct social interests, which is the metadata, or the
set of keywords, that describe the encountered node’s interests, roles, and responsibilities
(e.g. social interests such as “photography” and “gourmet cooking”, or role-specific
metadata such as “MANET researcher”, “military intelligence officer”); and (ii) transient
social relationships, which is aggregated information of the social interests of the people
that the node has encountered before. This approach allows the social interests to be
dynamically expanded, refined and aggregated in real-time into the richer transient social
relationships so as to capture multi-hop relationships. A destination for a message is
defined as a device with direct interest in keywords of the message whereas a relay is
defined as one with acquired interests.
ChitChat system consists of two major components with associated storage buffers:
(i) Realtime Transient Social Relationship (RTSR) modeling, and (ii) Message Routing.
The overall data flow in the ChitChat equipped network is as follows: When two users
come within communication range, the ChitChat system first invokes the RTSR module.
The RTSR module will automatically exchange the two users’ current Transient Social
Relationships (TSRs), resulting in an adjustment in their TSRs based on a growth-decay
model. Then, the ChitChat invokes the message routing to exchange a selected subset of
messages carried by the two users based on the analysis results of their revised TSRs.
Following subsections define RTSR and Message routing modules in detail.
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2.3. RTSR MODULE
The Real-time Transient Social Relationship modeling aims to represent the
evolution of each user’s social interests impacted by the people that they encounter. The
flow for RTSR after two ChitChat equipped devices have established connection is: i)
decay algorithm ii) exchange of decayed weights iii) growth algorithm. Initially when the
interest represented by a keyword is defined for the first time by a user, it's weight is set to
0.5. Maximum allowed value for the weight is 1.
Given below are the decay and growth algorithms:
•

Decay Algorithm
Given interest I for a user, the weight for I is decayed based on whether a device

with shared interest I is currently connected to this user’s device or not.
The variables in the following algorithm (Algorithm 1) are:
𝛽-decay constant, 𝑇𝑐 - current time,Tl - Latest timestamp at which a device with
interest I was connected, Wn- new weight, Wp- previous weight
Algorithm 1: Decay algorithm execution in device u
procedure DECAY(u)
for all I in device u
If a device with I is connected:
𝑊𝑛 = 𝑊𝑝
If a device with interest I is not connected:
If I is a direct interest, then
𝑊𝑛 = (𝑊𝑝 − 0.5)/(𝛽 ∗ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑙 )) + 0.5
Else
𝑊𝑛 = (𝑊𝑝 )/(𝛽 ∗ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑙 ))
end for
end procedure
Example execution: If device 1 is connected to device 2 and both have interest in
“food coupon" with a corresponding weight of 0.6 initially and both devices had a
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connected device with a shared interest “food coupon" about 5 seconds ago and which is
no longer connected, then new weights are calculated by the formula 𝑊𝑛 = (𝑊𝑝 −
0.5)/(𝛽 ∗ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑙 )) + 0.5, 𝑊𝑛 = (0.6 − 0.5)/(2 ∗ 5) + 0.5 = 0.55.
•

Growth Algorithm
After decay phase, the updated weights are exchanged. In the following algorithm

(Algorithm 2), the symbols are: 𝜓 is an integer value out of a set of {1,6} corresponding
to different cases. E.g., if both u and v have I as a direct interest, value of 𝜓 is 1. If u has a
direct interest and v has a transient interest, value of 𝜓 is 2. 𝑤𝑛 is the newweight of an
interest I in the node u whereas 𝑤𝑝 is the old weight. 𝑤𝑣 (𝐼) is the weight of interest I in v.
𝑇𝑣 is the time at which v established connection. Δ is the change in weight.
Algorithm 2: Growth algorithm execution in device u
procedure GROWTH(u)
for all interests I in device u
Δ=0
for all currently connected devices v
Δ+= (𝑤𝑣 (𝐼) ∗ (𝑇𝑐 − 𝑇𝑣 ))/𝜓
end for
𝑤𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{1, 𝑤𝑝 + Δ}
end for
end procedure
2.4. MESSAGE ROUTING MODULE
The message routing module selects better message forwarders based on their
Transient Social Relationships. Moreover, each relay has a message buffer with a fixed
size. After this execution is done, messages are routed according to the sum of weights of
social interests in the sending device and receiving device. If the sum of weights of interests
for a message in sending device is less than that in receiving device, then that message is
forwarded. If 𝑆𝑣 > 𝑆𝑢 for message M, then forward message M to device v, where u is the
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sending device, v is the receiving device, and 𝑆𝑢 and 𝑆𝑣 are the sum of weights for interests
in message M in devices u and v.

3. DTN ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW

In Figure 3.1, the overall architecture of the developed system is shown. The
devices owned by Alice and Bob are deployed with the implementation of the proposed
system. After establishing connection, the RTSR+DR module shares annotations and
encountered devices’ reputations. The message router module in Alice then selects the
messages for which Bob can be destination or relay by incorporating mechanism. The same

Figure 3.1. Data Flow between Two Connected Nodes
module is run by Bob. Following this, Alice and Bob have option of adding more text
annotations to the received messages in message buffer by running content enrichment
module. Additionally, they can run the module of proposed Distributed Reputation
Model(DRM) and input ratings for the messages. The three contributions of our work are

21

Incentive Mechanism, Distributed Reputation Model and Content Enrichment through
annotations. The three subsections included in this section discusses message format,
incentive mechanism and distributed reputation model.
3.1. MESSAGE FORMAT
The multimedia message format is shown in Figure 3.2 where (i) topic implies
interests (ii) location parameters such as latitude and longitude are stored as key-value

Figure 3.2. Message Format
attributes. A message in the system is an encapsulation of the multimedia data along with
some metadata tags. Additionally, a UUID which is a unique identifier for the message
makes sure that the message does not get duplicated in any device. A timestamp, the time
at which the multimedia content for the message created is also added as a part of the
message. Source and destinations, MIME and format of the message are also added.
3.2. INCENTIVE MECHANISM
The proposed incentive mechanism is credit and reputation based. This subsection
explains the credit based part. All the nodes are assigned a start value of incentive tokens
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that can be used to perform the message dissemination as well as for making the content
enriched. The factors considered for incentive determination are categorized as software
and hardware. The software parameters are specific to user and content quality, whereas
hardware parameters comprise of energy consumption in providing the service.
In our model, a source or a relay forwards a message to another relay node along
with a promise of certain number of incentive tokens from a destination upon successful
delivery of the message. In the case where there are more than one hops from a source to
destination, a relay follows the exact same process that a source follows. Additionally, if a
relay A transfers a message to a relay B, A receives a fraction of incentive from B if B has
a very high chance of delivering the message. For example, for a message M tagged with
a set of interests/keywords I{i1,i2,...in} having corresponding set of weights
W{w1,w2,..,wn} to be forwarded from relay A to relay B, an average of weights 𝐴𝑤 are
computed for message for the remote node B. If 𝐴𝑤 is greater than a certain very high predefined value, B offers a percentage of incentive token values to A.
Table 3.1. Symbol Descriptors
𝐼𝑠

Promised incentive value due to software factors

𝐼ℎ

Promised incentive value due to hardware factors

𝑃𝑣

Priority level of message M to node v

𝑅𝑢

Role of the sending user

𝐼𝑚

Maximum incentive possible

S

Size of the message

𝑆𝑚

Maximum size of messages in u

𝑄

Quality of the message

𝑄𝑚

Maximum quality of a message from a set of
messages in u

𝑃𝑠

Priority of a message set by source of the message(13 for high, medium, low)

𝑤

Weight of interest for a message
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Table 3.1. Symbol Descriptors(Contd.)
𝑤𝑚

Maximum out of sum of weights of interests as
known by u corresponding to all connected devices
for a message

𝑃𝑟

Reception power for a device

𝑃𝑡

Transmission power for a device

𝐿𝑣

Path loss

𝐼𝑡

Incentive reward to a relay due to all added tags

𝐼𝑡 𝑘

Incentive reward to a relay due to an added tag k

𝑅𝑖

Rating of the message i

𝑅𝑡

Input Rating for the tags of a received message

𝐶

Confidence of a user in the input rating of tags

𝐶𝑚

Maximum possible value of confidence

𝑅𝑞

Rating for quality of message

𝛼

Weight of self-calculate rating

𝑟𝑣,𝑢

Rating of device v in device u

𝑚𝑣

Message received from v

𝑟𝑚𝑣

Rating of message 𝑚𝑣

𝑟𝑚𝑣 ,𝑥

Rating of message 𝑚𝑣 corresponding to node x and as
known by node v

𝑟𝑚

Maximum device rating

𝐼𝑣

Incentive awarded to node v for a message 𝑚𝑣

A destination can also reward an intermediate node if that node added additional
relevant message annotations to in-transit messages. The motivation behind relays
enriching content is, therefore, attainment of higher incentive. Finally, if a device exhausts
all of its tokens, it is no longer allowed to receive messages that it itself is interested in.
This results in reduced network congestion. Calculation of incentive promise is explained
in following subsections, ordered as Software factors and Hardware factors.
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•

Software factors
The user-centric factors considered here are priority level of message defined by

source, role of a user, priority level of message to the destination. The data-centric factors
considered are size and quality of the message. The table above shows the parameters used
in our algorithms.
Users might have different roles (R) based upon the scenario of DTN deployment.
For example, in a battlefield deployment, users can be Sergeant, Soldier, etc. The user on
top of hierarchy has a role 1. In this example, 1 corresponds to a user who is a Sergeant. If
Soldier is the next role in the hierarchy, this category corresponds to 2, and so on. Priority
level of a message M that is possessed by a user u that intends to forward it to user v(𝑃𝑣 ) is
defined as a ratio of i) sum of weights of interestsfor message M in v as known by u(∑ 𝑤)
to ii) maximum sum of weights of interests for the message amongst all the devices
connected to u(𝑤𝑚 ). 𝑃𝑣 ensures that maximum incentive promise is provided to a node
which belongs to a set of currently connected nodes and has the highest delivery
probability. When two nodes connect and are in routing phase of ChitChat, a set of
algorithms are executed, first of which is the following:
Algorithm 3: Calculate incentive promised from user u to user v due
to software factors
procedure calculateIncentive(u,v)
if 𝑃𝑣 =0 and 𝑅𝑢 < 𝑅𝑣 and 𝑃𝑠 = 1(high)
𝐼𝑠 = 𝐼𝑚
else If 𝑃𝑣 <> 0,
do 𝑃𝑣 = (∑ 𝑤)/(𝑤𝑚 )
𝐼𝑠 = (1/4 ∗ (𝑆/𝑆𝑚 + 𝑄/𝑄𝑚 ) + ½ ∗ (𝑃𝑣 /(𝑅𝑢 ∗ 𝑃𝑢 ))) ∗ 𝐼𝑚
end if
end procedure
To explain the above algorithm, consider a scenario of battlefield with user roles as
ßoldier" represented by 2 and ßergeant" represented by 1. Device u belongs to a sergeant
and device v to a soldier. Even if v cannot deliver a high priority message tothe destination
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at the current moment, it might still acquire the TSRs corresponding to the message,
resulting in non-zero probability of v’s ability to deliver the message. Device v is promised
maximum possible incentive. Instead, if v can deliver the message, factors such as size of
the message, quality of message and others are taken into account and incentive is a factor
of maximum incentive possible. Greater the size of the message, greater the incentive
promise to v as a long message reduces the buffer size by a higher factor compared to
smaller message. To ensure that the messages generated in the system are of higher quality,
high quality promises higher incentive. In the formula given above in else case, user-centric
and data-centric factors each have 50 percent weight in deciding the incentive promised.
•

Hardware factors
The hardware parameter taken into consideration is the power consumption in

transmission of a message. If a source directly delivers a message to the destination, the
incentive tokens corresponding to the amount of power consumed in transmitting that
message is awarded to the source by the destination. If a relay instead delivers the message
to the destination, it receives incentive tokens proportional to the amount of power
consumed in receiving the message as well as forwarding of the message. 𝐼ℎ represents the
incentive tokens’ promise corresponding to hardware factor.
As battery conservation is significant issue in mobile devices, source and relay must
be rewarded proportionally for the energy consumption in relaying. Friis equation [29] is
used for calculating power consumption on receiver side. Incentive promise is defined as
a function of power consumption. The parameters involved in Friis equation are i)
transmission power, ii) receiving power, iii) distance between the connection devices, iv)
Bandwidth. The receiving power can be calculated using Friis equation as follows:
𝑃𝑟 = 𝑃𝑡 /𝐿𝑣
where
𝐿𝑣 = (4 ∗ 𝜋 ∗ 𝑅/𝜆)2
R=distance between two devices and 𝜆=bandwidth
When a source directly delivers a message to the destination, the incentive
proportional to the battery consumption is only a function of transmission power and
elapsed time.
𝐼ℎ = 𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑡
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where c is a constant, 𝑃𝑡 is the transmission power of the source and t is time elapsed in
delivering the message.
When a relay delivers a message to the destination, the data dissemination
consumes battery in the relay in the reception of the message from another relay or source
as well as in the transmission of this message to the destination. So the relay should
becompensated for both of these actions. In this case, incentive tokens’ value is defined as
follows:
𝐼ℎ = 𝑐 ∗ (𝑃𝑡 + 𝑃𝑟 ) ∗ 𝑡
where c is a proportionality constant, 𝑃𝑡 is the transmission power used by relay in
forwarding the message to the destination and 𝑃𝑟 is the power consumed in receiving the
message from another source or relay. So, the total incentive promise to a relay is the sum
of the incentive due to the software and hardware factors:
𝐼 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐼𝑠 + 𝐼ℎ , 𝐼𝑚 }
In addition to the incentive tokens provided by above formula, relay nodes are
compensated for additional annotations applied to the in-transit messages. The relay node
delivering the message with the added relevant annotations to a destination collects this
additional incentive from the destination. If a relay adds n additional keywords and only x
are relevant for a destination, the destination will only compensate for x tags. Given the set
of relevant added tags T{𝑡1 , 𝑡2 . . 𝑡𝑥 }. The incentive 𝐼𝑡 rewarded for added tags is:
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{∑ 𝐼𝑡 𝑘 , 𝐼𝑐 }
𝐼𝑐 is a cap on incentive tokens for additional tags. 𝐼𝑡 𝑘 is the incentive due to one
added tag defined as follows:
𝐼𝑡 𝑘 = 𝑧 ∗ 𝐼𝑚
where 𝐼𝑚 is the maximum incentive defined earlier and z is a constant such that
0<𝑧<1.
3.3. DISTRIBUTED REPUTATION MODEL
The main motivation behind the development of this model is to reduce the number
of malicious users which might add irrelevant tags for a message in the pursuit of acquiring
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more incentive tokens. For example, it might happen that a message containing an image
is tagged with keywords "red car" but there is no "red car" in the image. In such a case, a
destination will end up paying for the irrelevant tags as well, thus wasting it’s incentive
tokens for sharing. To counteract this problem, we propose the following solution. Nodes
can assign a rating to messages that they acquire. A recipient node can rate the source and
other intermediate nodes(if any) of a message. The source is rated for the message quality
and the added tags whereas an intermediate node is rated for any of the added tags in the
process of content enrichment. These nodes subsequently calculate the device ratings for
the source and relays. Rating of a node is calculated as an average of ratings of the messages
received from that node. They share this rating with the next hop in the path of message
traversal to a destination. When a message eventually reaches the destination, the
delivering device also sends the destination the ratings for the message from all the hops
in the path that might have assigned a rating to the message. The destination utilizes these
ratings and any previously acquired knowledge about the reputation of the delivering node
to decide the number of incentive tokens to be awarded to the delivering node. The
reputation of the deliverer is taken into account in order to avoid highly penalizing a good
deliverer.
•

Rating of a message
When a user receives a message, the user can assign the message rating for the

nodes in the path of the message. Source of the message is rated based on the amount of
relevant annotations as well as quality of the message as input by the recipient. A relay in
the path is rated for the additional annotations that it might have added to the message. A
user might not have a total confidence in the rating he/she inputs for the annotations. For
example, if an image of a person named "Adam" is annotated with the keyword "Adam"
but the user has a conjecture that the image is in fact of a person named "Bill". The user is
not entirely certain. In this case, the user can add a confidence value on the ratings of tags.
The rating of a source node is calculated as:
𝑅𝑖 = 1/2 ∗ (𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶/𝐶𝑚 ) + 1/2 ∗ 𝑅𝑞
The rating of an intermediate node in the path is calculated as:
𝑅𝑖 = (𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶/𝐶𝑚 )
Following this, the rating for nodes in the path of the message is computed.
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1. Rating of a node and incentive award
Rating of a node is computed in two cases: 1) When a node in the path of a message
assigns a rating to nodes in the path before it, and 2) When say node 1 receives rating of
node 2 from node 3. These cases are handled in the following manner:
Case 1: When a node u assigns a rating corresponding to a message M to a node v
in the path of M, u calculates the rating of v as an average of ratings of messages received
from device v.
𝑟𝑣,𝑢 = ∑ 𝑟𝑚 𝑣 /𝑁
where N is the total number of message received from node v.
Case 2: When node u receives a rating of node v from node z, u performs the
calculation for rating of node v as follows:
𝑟𝑣,𝑢 = (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝑟𝑣,𝑧 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑟𝑣,𝑢
Consider a destination node u receiving a message 𝑚𝑣 from node v. v also transmits
the ratings assigned to all the nodes X corresponding to 𝑚𝑣 . Then, the incentive awarded
to node v by node u is as follows:
𝐼𝑣 = ((1 − 𝛼) ∗ (∑ 𝑟𝑚𝑣 ,𝑥 )/𝑁 + 𝛼 ∗ 𝑟𝑣,𝑢 /𝑟𝑚 )) ∗ (𝐼 + 𝐼𝑡 )
where 𝛼 > 0.5, N is the number of hops in the path of the message 𝑚𝑣 from a source to
the destination u
Summing up everything, the overall data flow between two connected devices u
and v is as follows: Devices u and v connect, and share their interests with each other. u
generates two sets of messages, a set of messages for which v is a destination and another
set of messages for which v is a relay. For the first set, u requests v the promised incentive
tokens while also sharing the ratings of the nodes in the path of the message. Device v
calculates 𝐼𝑎 and checks whether 𝐼𝑎 is less than the number of incentive tokens left on it. If
it has that many tokens left, it awards the deliverer and the deliverer then delivers the
message. The second set of messages from u to v for which u is a relay is further divided
into two subsets. The first subset consists of messages for which v has a very high
probability of meeting the destination whereas the second set consists of messages for
which v has a higher probability of sending the message compared to u. u asks for a
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percentage of promised incentive from v. If v has that many tokens left, they are awarded
to u and the message is received. v receives the full incentive promised by delivering the
message. u subsequently forwards the messages in the second subset free of cost to v along
with the incentive promised.

4. OPERATOR FUNCTIONS

This section describes the user defined functions that the system must perform in
conformance with the proposed approach. Some of these functions require human
intervention. The format of the operator functions is given below:
Function 1: Operator Function (Input(optional))
Returns: Output
User Task(Optional): Instructions the crowd needs to follow during operations.
Task: Information regarding what operations (rank, verify, etc.) the crowd/worker
has to perform over the event.
As can be seen from above, user task and input are optional entities. For use of
some of the functions defined below, a user defined class called Message is created. The
format of this message is given earlier.
1) Annotate
This is the task a DTN user performs to annotate a file with the keywords that
describe the file. We consider the example of an image file. When a user selects an image
file from the file system of his/her device, the system can fetch semantics of keywords
from a cloud if the online network connectivity is available. The user can modify some of
the labels fetched, keeping the ones that suits the image. The user can also add custom
labels of his/her own. For example, the cloud’s image processing platform might not be
able to recognize face of a person in the image but the user knows who that person is. Thus,
the user can add this name to the annotations of the image. Furthermore, all the keywords
are assigned a weight of 0.5 initially when the annotations are saved. This initial weight is
in accordance with the ChitChat algorithm.
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Function 2: Annotate(byte[] ImageFile)
Returns: (String[] keywords)
User Task: Modify the labels fetched if required, assign message priority and
save the labels
Task: Fetch and save labels for the image from cloud, save location and
timestamp of the image
2) Subscribe
This function lets a user add keyword based interests that act as subscription
keywords. Any connected device possessing a message annotated with these subscription
keywords can share the messages with this user.
Function 2: Subscribe(String[] interests)
Returns: Void
User Task: Add keywords to the set of interests
Task: Save interests in the database
3) DecayWeights
This function corresponds to the ChitChat’s decay algorithm. Weights are decayed
upon establishing connection with a device within communication range.
Function 3: DecayWeights(String[] keywords, double[] weights)
Returns: (double[] weights)
Task: Decay weights according to phase one of ChitChat routing weights’
exchange algorithm
4) IncrementWeights
This function corresponds to the ChitChat’s growth algorithm which decays
weights according to the growth model. The resulting output is an incremented weights for
the given keywords.
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Function 4: IncrementWeights(String[] keywords,double[] weights)
Returns: (double[] weights)
Task: Increment weights according to phase two of ChitChat routing weights’
exchange algorithm
5) GetMessagesToForward
This function finds all the messages to be forwarded to a connected device with
certain discovered IP address or MAC address, depending upon the mode of
communication used, WiFi or Bluetooth.
Function 5:GetMessagesToForward(String[] RemoteDeviceInterests,String
DeviceAddress)
Returns: (Message[] messages)
Task: Iterate over the input interests array mapped with the device address and
find the corresponding messages
6) DeviceType
After determining a set of messages to be forwarded to a connected device, it is
important to decide if the connected device is a destination or a relay for every message.
Hence, this function is executed for all the messages intended to be forwarded to
aconnected device. A connected device is a relay if the subscription keywords of the device
is transient, otherwise it is a destination.
Function 6: DecideDestOrRelay(Message message,String MacAddress)
Returns: (String role)
Task: Determines if the connected node is a destination or a relay
7) BestRelay
Weight of an interest is a measure of encounter probability of the connected device
with a destination. When a device u is connected to more than one device with common
interests, this function decides the best relay to forward a message based on the weights of
interests. Message is forwarded to a relay having the highest encounter probability with the
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destination. The goal is to reduce the number of messages considerably without
significantly affecting the message delivery ratio.
Function 7: DecideBestRelay(String[] MacAddresses,Message message)
Returns: (String MacAddress)
Task: Return the best possible relay to forward the input message
8) Incentivize
When the message sharing module is executed, a source or relay forwarding the
message to either a relay or destination executes this function. If a source forwards a
message to a destination, the source computes the incentive tokens and requests them from
the destination before forwarding the message. If a source or relay is forwarding the
message to a relay, they can execute this function to determine the number of tokens that
need to be given to the receiving relay.
Function 8: ComputeIncentive(Message message,String MacAddress)
Returns: (double incentiveToken)
Task: Calculate the incentive tokens for this message
9) RateMessage
This function allows a user to rate a message according to DRM. The higher the
ratings of the message, higher is the possibility of the average of messages received from
the same source.
Function 9: RateMessage(Message M)
Returns: (double Rating)
User Task: Add ratings for i) message quality, ii)keywords for
the message and iii) give confidence value on ratings of keywords
Task: Calculate a rating value for the message
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10) RateNode
This function is used to calculate the rating of a device. This function belongs to
DRM module. This is calculated by performing the aggregate function average on ratings
of the message from the node. The input is device address of a source node in question.
Function 10: RateNode(String MacAddress)
Returns: (double Rating)
Task: Calculate rating for device based on all messages from the device as a
source
11) Enrich
This function is used by a relay to add further annotations to a message received
from another device and to be relayed.
Function 11: Enrich(Message message, String[] annotations) Returns:
(String[] newAnnotations)
Task: Save the added annotations from the user
User task: Add additional relevant keywords to the message

5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In this section, experimental settings are introduced first followed by the results.
All the experiments were conducted in ONE simulator version 1.6.0. We compare the
performance of our approach with the ChitChat routing algorithm upon which our work is
built on, and show how the proposed algorithm improves the performance. The results
shown are average of five simulation runs. Note that no other previous incentive scheme
considers content enrichment and ranking in DTN, and ChitChat beats other recent
competitive DTN social-based routing algorithms, therefore, we improve ChitChat
algorithm and our scheme can be integrated with any other DTN routing. The following
table shows the parameters used in our experiments.
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Table 5.1. Simulation Parameters
Configuration

Default Values

Number of Participants

500

Pool of Social Interest Keywords

200

No of Defined Social Interests

20 per node

Transmission speed

250 kBps

Transmission radius

100 meters

Buffer capacity

250 MB

Message Size

1 MB

Area

5 sq.km.

Simulated time

24 hours

Threshold for relay

0.8

Number of initial tokens

200 per node

In the table above, threshold for relay is explained with an imaginary scenario
mentioned subsequently. Consider a scenario in which relay 1 encounters relay 2 and a
connection is established between these nodes. Relay 1 possesses a message M for relay
2.M is tagged with a set of keywords T. If the average of weights of tags in T for relay 2
as known by relay 1 upon initial exchange of keywords is greater than the relay threshold,
relay 2 pays for a fraction of incentive being promised to it by relay 1 for M. To calculate
the performance of our approach, the experiments were conducted to find the effect of
fluctuation of selfish nodes’ percentage on message delivery ratio and traffic. Variation of
percentage of malicious nodes and it’s effect on MDR is also checked. Note that all the
experiments are conducted under Random Waypoint mobility model. Following
subsections explain various conducted experiments in detail:
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A. Effect of Selfish Users on Message Delivery Ratio
This is the result shown in Figure 5.1. In this experiment, the number of selfish
nodes kept is 500. We vary the percentage of selfish nodes at a rate of 10% from 0 to 100

Message Delivery Ratio
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Figure 5.1. MDR vs Percentage of Selfish Nodes

percent. The message delivery ratio in our approach is slightly lesser than ChitChat. The
reason behind this is the exhausted incentive tokens in nodes while performing the message
disseminations. There is inverse proportionality between the message delivery ratio and
percentage of selfish nodes. The primary reason behind this is that as the number of selfish
nodes rises, there will be lesser message dissemination because the selfish node randomly
participates in forwarding messages. For this experiment, the selfish nodes forward a
message to another encountered node in the network one out of ten times. This is simulated
by switching off the communication medium in the selfish nodes. A selfish node has its
communication medium open one out of ten times when it encounters another node in the
network. This is also the reason why the delivery ratio does not drop to absolute zero even
when the percentage of selfish nodes is 100.
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B. Reduced Traffic compared to ChitChat
This experiment is to find out what percentage of traffic is reduced over ChitChat
while there is a reduction in the delivery ratio. The result for this experiment is shown in
Figure 5.2 where all the parameters are kept exactly the same as the first experiment. As it
can be seen, the higher is the selfish nodes %, more the traffic is reduced. This result makes
sense because as the percentage of selfish nodes rises, the incentive tokens assigned to
them initially to participate in message forwarding, are exhausted faster.
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Figure 5.2. Percentage of Reduced Traffic over ChitChat

C. Effect of Tokens on the Message Delivery Ratio
The initial tokens assigned to the nodes are the ones that they use for participation
in message forwarding. The result of this experiment is shown in Figure 5.3.
The plots show that for a higher selfish percentage, the message delivery ratio is
lower. It also manifests that as the number of tokens assigned to the nodes increases, the
message delivery ratio also increases. This is because of the fact that incentive tokens in
the nodes will not exhaust rapidly because of high value of initially assigned tokens.
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D. Recognition of Malicious Nodes
Malicious nodes are defined as the nodes which might either add irrelevant tags to
the message or create low quality messages towards the goal of attaining higher incentive
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tokens by propagating messages in the network. In Figure 5.4, we find the rate at which
malicious nodes in the system are identified by non-malicious nodes. It is important to note
that all the above experiments are performed with the content enrichment. However, in
those experiments, the percentage of malicious nodes was kept to zero. Average rating of
malicious nodes in the non-malicious nodes is a factor which can explain the overall
capability of the developed Distributed Reputation Model. With this goal in sight, the
malicious nodes percentage is varied from 10 to 40 at an interval of 10. The highest rating
a node can assign to another node is 5 for the experiments. The time period of the
simulation is 24 hours. It is found that with the evolution of time, the recognition of
malicious nodes is accelerated. Moreover, as sthe number of malicious nodes increases,
faster the malicious nodes are recognized. This is owing to the fact that more the number
of malicious users in an area, more are the chances of a non-malicious node to encounter a
malicious node. The encountered non-malicious node then shares the rating of this
encountered malicious node with another encountered non-malicious node.
E. Effect of Number of Users on Message Delivery Ratio
This experiment was conducted in order to check how MDR is affected with a
varying number of users in a fixed area of 5 sq. km. The result is shown in Figure 5.5. The
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number of users is varied from 500 to 1500 with an interval of 500 users here. The plot
shows that as the number of users increases, the Message Delivery Ratio for both ChitChat
and Incentive increases. Another important observation here is that the difference between
the MDR for ChitChat and Incentive mechanism decreases gradually with the incremented
number of users and this difference almost fades away when the number of users are 1500.
The reason behind this gradual decline of MDR difference is that the number of message
carriers grows with the rise in the number of users.Therefore, a message might travel
through multiple paths.
F. Priority Segmented MDR
In the first two experiments, a decrease in MDR was compensated by the reduced
traffic overhead. However, it is important to analyze the quality of messages disseminated
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Figure 5.6. Priority Segmented MDR vs Selfish Percent of Nodes

by our scheme. Thus, we ran simulations where selfish percentage of nodes is kept at 20
percent and 40 percent. The number of nodes is 500 in a 5 sq km area. Out of these nodes,
50% of the nodes generated high quality larger size and high priority messages, 30%
created medium quality and the rest produced low quality. From the plot, it can be seen
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that in both the cases, viz., 20% and 40% selfish nodes, higher number of high priority
messages is delivered in our scheme compared to Chitchat. This is because our approach
prioritizes messages based on the quality as well as the assigned priority. Moreover, the
higher quality message has a larger size also, and thus, higher energy is consumed in
propagating, and therefore, the incentive received for forwarding such messages is also
higher. Therefore, nodes earn higher incentives making it an overall higher priority
message dissemination scheme.

6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we present a novel content-centric data dissemination technique using
a combination of credit as well as reputation based incentive mechanism designed, which
is integrated with Chitchat routing [5]. Our proposed scheme successfully delivers higher
quality and priority messages while motivating the selfish nodes to participate in content
enrichment and message forwarding to earn incentives. Our scheme is also successful in
identifying and barring the malicious nodes in the network from receiving messages. Our
experiments show that message delivery ratio attained is almost the same as ChitChat while
curbing the network congestion and malicious nodes even further. Moreover, the content
enrichment makes the content richer as the message propagates deeper into the network. A
demo application for our mechanism has also been developed and tested for Android
environment for Bluetooth as a communication medium [24]. Stress testing in the real
world environment will help in evaluating the performance and usability of our mechanism.
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II. INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR DATA-CENTRIC MESSAGE DELIVERY
IN DELAY TOLERANT NETWORKS

ABSTRACT

A key issue in delay tolerant networks (DTN) is to find the right node to store and
relay messages. We consider messages annotated with the unique keywords describing the
message subject, and nodes also adds keywords to describe their mission interests, priority
and their transient social relationship (TSR). To offset resource costs, an incentive
mechanism is developed over transient social relationships which enrich en-route message
content and motivate better semantically related nodes to carry and forward messages. The
incentive mechanism ensures avoidance of congestion due to uncooperative or selfish
behavior of nodes.

1. INTRODUCTION

Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) use store and forward paradigm for message
dissemination in an environment that lacks continuous connectivity due to the presence of
obstacles/inactive nodes or in absence of communication infrastructure support. In DTN,
users can share messages based on their social interests. For a higher data delivery rate, we
use message annotations in [2] for in-transit mission packets for data-centric intelligent
routing decisions. A node passes messages to intermediate individuals, which match or
exceed the strength of keyword-based annotations of the message. In addition, intermediate
nodes add keywords-based annotations to create higher content strength messages and will
direct messages toward the destination. In our work here, thus, content gets enriched as the
situation evolves, such as in a disaster situation, traffic event/condition or in a battlefield.
However, battery and memory are limited in mobile devices, therefore, even with the most
efficient routing algorithms in place, some nodes turn uncooperative to conserve resources.
In addition, some nodes may start generating a lot of messages which might lead to
unfairness in message dissemination and can cause network congestion.
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To counteract these challenges, an incentive mechanism [3] is developed on top of
Chit-chat algorithm [1] for better message dissemination and to address selfish behavior.
In this approach, incentives are provided to nodes for active participation of the high
priority messages forwarding and for enriching the content of en-route messages. The
objective of this demo paper is to demonstrate the developed DTN application to address
the aforementioned problems.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Given a mobile device possessing a set of messages to be forwarded in DTN, the
problem is to design an incentive mechanism on top of our existing ChitChat algorithm [1]
for efficient message delivery. The incentive formulation must correctly consider the
significant factors that encourage data-centric dissemination of messages. If an interested
device does not have any incentive to allocate to a relay node, it should not receive the
message for forwarding.

3. ARCHITECTURE

The incentive mechanism developed on top of an already existing ChitChat
algorithm [1] achieves faster and higher message delivery ratio using nodes’ transient
social interests for data delivery. A universal message format is used throughout the
network for the sake of consistency. The following subsections illustrate message format,
ChitChat algorithm and the incentive mechanism.
3.1. MESSAGE FORMAT
The multimedia message format is shown in Figure 3.1 where (i) topic implies
interests (ii) location parameters such as latitude and longitude are stored as keyvalue
attributes. A message in the system is an encapsulation of the multimedia data along with
some metadata tags. Additionally, a UUID which is a unique identifier for the message
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makes sure that the message does not get duplicated in any device. A timestamp, the time
at which the multimedia content for the message created is also added as a part of the
message. Source and destinations, MIME and format of the message are also added.

Figure 3.1. Message Format

3.2. CHITCHAT
In ChitChat, social interests can either be created or acquired. They are termed as
direct and transient interests respectively. The following sections explain the two phases
of ChitChat:
1. Weight exchange phase
For a given node, when a remote node falls in communication range, a connection
attempt is initiated. Once the nodes are connected, the weight update algorithm is triggered
for every pair of nodes. This algorithm works in three phases. Initially, the weights are
decayed as per the decay model. Decayed weights are then shared and weights are finally
updated as per growth model. As a result of this, interests of the connected devices can be
acquired. The value of weight for acquired interests start to decline as per decay model
when no other device with that interest is currently connected. Such interests are therefore
only transient in nature.
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2. Message routing phase
Once the interests and weights are updated and shared, ChitChat’s routing
algorithm determines the set of messages that need to be forwarded. The messages are
forwarded to all those nodes which are either destinations or a subset of relays which have
higher probability of delivering them to the destination, either directly or indirectly. The
probability of a message getting delivered is a function of the sum of weights of individual
interests mapped with the message. The proposed incentive algorithm is run on forwarding
the messages within ChitChat to address uncooperative and selfish behavior. The details
of this algorithm are explained in the following section.
3.3. INCENTIVE MECHANISM
The incentive mechanism begins with determining whether the connected node is
an intermediate node or a destination.
Based on whether the node has a direct social interest or transient social interest in
the message, the node is classified as a relay or destination. If it is an intermediate node,
an incentive calculation is done before forwarding the message. Subsequently, the message
is forwarded to the connected node along with the promised value of reward equal to the
calculated incentive. If the connected node is a destination, the message is forwarded and
the incentive reward equal to the promise is collected.
The mechanism works in such a way that an intermediate node is ensured an
incentive it can receive when it forwards (may also add additional keywords) a message to
the destination. The destination provides the promised incentive. Only a device which first
delivers a message to the destination is given the incentive for that message. However, the
devices can share a message with multiple destinations.
The value of the promised incentive depends on factors such as the level of interest
of the connected node in the content of the message, priority level of the message set by
the source, size of the message, quality of the message and energy consumption of the
connected devices. Some of these parameters are static whereas others are dynamic.
Priority level of the message set by the source, size of the message and quality of the
message are static, implying that once the message has been created, they do not change.
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Interest level in message and energy consumption are dynamic as they are device
dependents.
A value of maximum incentive is predefined. A formula is used to calculate the
value of promised incentive as a function of above parameters. The formula also ensures
that the incentive promise for a message cannot exceed more than the maximum allowed
value. Therefore, an incentive value for a message is either equal to or a fraction of the
maximum incentive allowed. Figure 3.2 shows the data flow between two connected nodes.

Figure 3.2. Data Flow between Two Nodes

Source generates a message and forwards it to the destinations and relays. Initially,
all the devices are assigned the same initial value of incentive tokens before the data flow
takes place. The devices can then utilize the allotted tokens to share content. A device with
no incentive to offer cannot act as a destination. This implies that if the device has not
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participated as an intermediary and is eventually left with zero incentive tokens to offer, it
has to first participate as an intermediary to gain incentives.

4. DTN IMPLEMENTATION

The DTN application is designed to use Bluetooth communication in Android
devices for sharing messages.
Figure 4.1 shows a gallery screen where an image is already selected. A user of the
application can generate a message by either clicking an image using camera or select an
image from the gallery. In both cases, the user is provided with a set of keywords extracted
from the image using Google Cloud Vision API. Following screens

Figure 4.1. Gallery
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are shown to the user. After the image is selected, the textbox gets automatically populated
with the keywords by Google Cloud Vision API. A user can now edit the keywords and
add more. Henceforth, these keywords act as interests for the user. When these keywords
are saved using add tags button, a new message is created in the background which saves
the added interests, the location where the keywords were edited/added and the timestamp
of the image. Alternatively, the user could also click an image using camera screen. The
flow in that case would be the same.
Figure 4.2 shows the interests page. This page shows the user-interests using
keywords, their weights and the MAC address of the device via which the device acquired
the social interest. A value of SELF implies that the interest in the keyword is direct,
otherwise it is indirect and hence, transient.
Figure 4.3 shows a screen where two lists are displayed for nearby devices and
connected devices. Two other devices were kept in communication range of the
application. The screen shows that both the devices are nearby and also connected. There

Figure 4.2. User Interests
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might be other devices in range but they might not have the developed application installed.
Such devices will be shown in nearby devices list but not under the list of connected
devices.

Figure 4.3. Neighbors Listing

Figure 4.4 shows a screen where a list of received messages are displayed in a grid
fashion. The images have caption as the path of the image. When a user clicks on any
message, a message details screen is shown. The messages received were either destined
for the device or to be forwarded so that it can relay the messages. This is determined by
clicking on the message which directs the user to the message details screen.
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Figure 4.4. Received Messages

Figure 4.5 shows a received message displayed as a combination of an image and
it’s metadata tags such as Source MAC, Source Name, interests shown as keywords,
latitude, longitude, and timestamp. Source MAC and source name identify the originator
of the message in the network. Timestamp lets the destination node know when the
message was generated.
The application also has screens for checking the available incentives to offer and
also to check the messages generated locally. There is also a screen that can be used to add
interests manually. The operations mentioned in the architecture always run in the
background. Every few minutes, neighboring nodes can be discovered by performing
Bluetooth discovery. The energy overhead involved here cannot be eliminated as if a
device has no clue to which devices are in the vicinity, it cannot initiate a connection
attempt. Also, Bluetooth discovery consumes maximum bandwidth available to a device.
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This implies that if a device is already conducting transactions of data transfer, performing
Bluetooth discovery may break the existing connections.

Figure 4.5. Message Details

To conquer this hindrance, a solution is devised which first checks if there are any
transactions in process at the time discovery is scheduled. If this is true, Bluetooth
discovery is delayed until the transactions are finished.

5.DEMO SHOWN

For a demo, three Android devices are taken, viz., devices A, B and C. This is to
make sure that there are at least some messages that travel two hops. Initially, all the
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devices are given an incentive of 50 tokens. Device A is placed in the communication range
of device B, whereas device B is kept in communication range of the device C.
However, device A’s and device C’s Bluetooth range do not overlap. Bluetooth of
devices A and B is now switched on. Initially, Device A is stored with 40 messages of
varying sizes that device B is interested in. Bluetooth of devices A and B is switched on.
When checked, B had received about 22 messages in total based on TSR values (messages
whose TSR values were higher at B). Incentives are distributed next based on several
factors such as TSR, energy used, priority etc. When the incentive screen is opened in
Device B to check the incentives left, it is found that device B has zero reward to offer.
Therefore, device B did not receive anymore messages from device A as it does not have
any more incentives to offer.
The interests of devices B and C are also kept exactly the same. Next, Bluetooth of
device A is switched off and Bluetooth of C is switched on. B now shares the messages
with C after it adds some more keywords to make these messages enriched in content.
Device B has now obtained some incentives from C. Device A’s Bluetooth is turned on
again. The remaining 18 messages are transferred to device B as it has now earned
incentives. This demo shows that when B had no incentive value, it could not receive any
more interesting messages. When C received 18 messages from B, it also adds additional
keywords in some of the messages to enrich the message content.

6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This paper demonstrates the developed Android application implementing the
proposed incentive mechanism for sharing data using ChitChat in DTN. An incentive
mechanism has been implemented which prevents users from becoming selfish and
motivates them to relay more content-rich messages. The application also bars selfish users
from receiving data intended for them until they have enough incentives to pay for the
messages. Currently the application is developed for Bluetooth and Android, and next it
will be developed using WiFi Direct which is ad hoc wireless connection. It will also be
developed for other operating systems.
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SECTION

3. CONCLUSION

We have developed an incentive mechanism for data-centric file sharing in DelayTolerant networks. We have observed that the Message Delivery Ratio(MDR) is slightly
lower compared to Chitchat for not too high value of initial tokens. The results lead us to
conclude that the slightly lesser MDR is compensated by the highly diminished traffic.
More higher quality and higher priority messages are delivered in our incentive approach.
To achieve higher MDR, assign higher initial number of tokens to all the nodes but in this
case, the traffic reduction is also moderate. Depending upon the application, the number of
initial tokens can be set considering the trade-off between the Message Delivery Ratio and
the traffic. The demo of the application shows the usability of the developed scheme in real
world scenario.
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